










Competition in the Netherlands 
An analysis of the period 1993-2001 
 
Harold Creusen, Bert Minne, Henry van der Wiel  




CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Van Stolkweg 14 
P.O. Box 80510 
2508 GM  The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
Telephone  +31 70 338 33 80 
Telefax  +31 70 338 33 50 






ISBN 30-5833-303-5  
  3 
Abstract in English 
Competition in the Dutch market sector as a whole probably slightly declined during 1993-
2001. Within the market sector, a large variety in competition development exists. Competition 
changes have been rather small in many industries competition, but a considerable number of 
industries experienced a sharp rise or strong fall in competition. These findings are puzzling in 
light of regulatory reforms that have been implemented in the period observed. Yet, 
econometric analysis suggests that regulatory reforms could have intensified competition. 
However, strong growth of market demand has weakened competition and it counterbalanced to 
some extent the impact of regulatory reforms. If demand grows more rapidly than supply, then 
incumbent firms compete less aggressively. This should attract new competitors if entry barriers 
are low. Although entry has a positive effect on competition, its contribution has been 
negligible or even slightly negative. The analysis is based on two competition indicators. The 
model considerably explains the development of both indicators at the industry level. However, 
several determinants have statistically insignificant coefficients, particularly the estimated 
coefficients of entry and exit rates.  
  
Key words: competition, measurement, competition policy 
 
JEL code: D4, L1, L5  
Abstract in Dutch 
De concurrentie in de Nederlandse marktsector is waarschijnlijk licht gedaald gedurende 1993-
2001. In menig bedrijfstak veranderde de concurrentie weinig, maar dat geldt niet voor alle. 
Sommige bedrijfstakken laten een sterke daling of stijging zien. De concurrentiebevorderende 
beleidsmaatregelen hebben de concurrentie gestimuleerd. De sterk toegenomen vraag zorgde 
echter voor minder concurrentie. Als de vraag sterker toeneemt dan het aanbod kunnen 
bedrijven hogere prijzen vragen en hoeven ze onderling minder fel te concurreren. Hogere 
winsten zouden toetreding van bedrijven moeten uitlokken. Alhoewel toetreding gunstig 
uitwerkt op concurrentie, heeft het niet geleid tot een substantieel hogere concurrentie in de 
onderzochte periode. De analyse is gebaseerd op twee concurrentie indicatoren. Het model 
blijkt het concurrentieverloop van beide goed te kunnen verklaren. Wel blijken een aantal 
verklarende variabelen statistisch niet significant, met name die van toe- en uittreding. 
 
Steekwoorden: concurrentie, maatstaven, concurrentiebeleid 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.  
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Preface 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, policy makers took various measures to stimulate 
competition. This document analyses to what extent competition in Dutch industries changed in 
the period 1993-2001. Competition development is measured with two indicators derived from 
a firm-level database containing approximately 87 000 firms. Furthermore, it tries to provide an 
explanation for the findings by using a model that relates competition to a number of 
explanatory variables, including policy measures, entry and exit of firms. The approach has a 
rather explorative character as this type of research is still in its infancy.  
 
The project team that conducted this research included Harold Creusen, Bert Minne and Henry 
van der Wiel (project leader). They thank Stephan Raes and Anne Reitsma of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs; Jan Boone (CentER), Henk Don, Free Huizinga, Henk Kox, and Björn 
Vroomen (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) for valuable comments on 
earlier drafts. They also appreciated others for providing useful comments and insights, 
particularly of the EIM and the attendants of the Encore Conference in Amsterdam (April 
2004), the CAED/BLD conference in Cardiff (August 2005) and the ISS Schumpeter 
Conference 2006 in Sophia-Antipolis (June 2006). 
 
The authors also benefited from the advice and assistance on data and econometric issues of 
George van Leeuwen (Statistics Netherlands). Special thanks also to Fred Kuypers for his 
technical support. Finally, Richard Nahuis deserves special mention as he passed away on 
December 6, 2005, but he inspired this research in his well-known way.  
 
The firm-level data are provided by the Centre for Research of Economic Microdata (CEREM) 
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Summary 
Policy makers took various measures to raise the competitive pressure in product markets 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. International examples are the removal of barriers to the 
internal market of the European Union (EU) in 1992, the policy agenda set by the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000 and WTO-agreements. On top of that, Dutch policy makers renewed 
the Competition Act (‘Mededingingswet’) in 1998. They also reformed regulations in the so-
called MDW-operation (in Dutch: Marktwerking, Deregulering en Wetgevingskwaliteit) to 
stimulate competition in specific industries, and they privatised sectors like telecommunication. 
Policy is concerned about competition, because competition is important for productivity 
and economic growth. Competitive pressure stimulates firms to operate efficiently by, for 
instance, ‘cutting the fat out’ of their organizations. It also brings prices in line with marginal 
costs, lowering the rents of producers and increasing consumer surplus. Vigorous competition 
may therefore result in more productivity as resources and output are allocated to their most 
productive use. Competition may also stimulate firms to innovate, which enhances productivity 
and economic growth. 
So far, the development of competition in the Netherlands since the early 1990s has hardly 
been investigated at an economy-wide scale. Despite policy interest and some illustrative 
studies, a clear overall view on whether or not competition has become fiercer and why, is still 
an unsettled research topic. 
Questions 
This lack of information leads to the key questions of this document: 
·  How has competition changed across Dutch industries between 1993 and 2001? 
·  To what extent can this change in competition be explained? 
·  What are the implications for policy? 
 
Main conclusions 
Using two indicators for competition, the intensity of competition in the Dutch market sector as 
a whole has probably slightly declined between 1993 and 2001. This decline is partly related to 
a shift in the industrial structure to services industries with on average less intense competition. 
At the industry level, there is a wide variety in competition developments across industries. 
Competition changes have been rather small in many industries, but a considerable number of 
industries experienced a sharp rise or strong fall in competition.  
 
These findings are puzzling taking into account that policy took various measures in an attempt 
to raise competitive pressure. Empirical evidence reveals that regulatory reforms have likely 
had a positive impact on competition. In contrast, considerable growth of market demand in the  
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1990s had a negative impact on competition. If demand grows more rapidly than supply, 
incumbent firms compete less aggressively. This should attract new competitors to the market if 
entry barriers are limited. Although the entry of firms positively affects competition, the overall 
effect of entry on competition has been seemingly negligible. 
 
At the industry level, the indicators frequently contradict in the direction of competition change. 
These contradictions are probably related to a different response of the indicators to a 
reallocation of output from inefficient to efficient firms. 
 
The findings have the following main implications for policy. First, the insufficient pressure of 
(potential) entrants during the high economic growth in the second half of the 1990s may point 
to a lack of firm dynamics in relation with potential entry barriers on Dutch markets. Second, 
other determinants may counteract the impact of policy measures on competition as source to 
stimulate firms. 
Indicators of competition 
The analysis is based on two competition indicators: the price-cost margin and the relative 
profits measure, recently launched by Boone (2000a). The main idea of the relative profits 
measure is that fiercer competition enables efficient firms to earn higher profits than their 
inefficient competitors. In fact, fiercer competition induces efficient firms to exploit their 
efficiency advantage and push aside less efficient firms. The price-cost margin refers to the 
firms’ ability to set their prices above their marginal cost. If there are many competitors on a 
market with a low level of demand, then competition forces their firms to reduce prices until 
marginal costs. 
The indicators are computed from a comprehensive firm-level database of 87 000 Dutch firms. 
The database covers large parts of the Dutch market sector including industries of the 
manufacturing industry, construction, trade, transport and commercial services sector. Data 
availability limits the analysis to the period 1993-2001.  
Both indicators can be biased for at least two reasons. First, both measures are based on 
average variable costs instead of marginal costs, as there are no data of marginal costs available. 
Furthermore, defining the relevant market is a notorious problem, and may consequently affect 
the outcome of the indicators. 
No increase in competition during 1993-2001 
We investigated the development of competition at two levels of aggregation: at the market 
sector as a whole sector and at the industry level.  
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At the level of the market sector, competition declined during 1993-2001 according to both 
indicators. This conclusion is based on two approaches to aggregate industry results. The first 
approach assumes that changes in competition in the market sector entirely depend on 
competition changes of each industry separately. We assume no substitutability of products 
between industries. The second approach states that differences in competition intensities across 
industries do have real economic consequences. Products of industries are to some extent 
substitutes. Hence, if changes in competition at the industry level alter the relative prices 
between the industries, they also affect the industrial structure. The second approach shows that 
part of the decline in competition of the market sector is due to a shift in the industrial structure 
from manufacturing towards services. In general, the level of competition is higher for the 
manufacturing industry than for services.  
 
At the industry level, both indicators do not suggest that competition increased for most 
industries. Instead, they show a wide variety in competition developments across industries. 
Although competition changes have been rather small in many industries, a considerable 
number of industries experience a sharp rise or strong fall in competition. 
Comparison of indicators per industry 
Empirical evidence shows that the indicators frequently contradict each other on the direction of 
the change in competition per industry. The measures point in a different direction in half of all 
observed industries. These diverging results underline the theoretical notion that the relative 
profits measure and the (weighted) price-cost margin may contradict if reallocation effects 
within an industry are substantial. Such shifts in market shares occur if firms change their 
conduct and efficient firms behave more aggressively. As a result, efficient firms gain market 
shares (reallocation effect) and inefficient firms can even be forced to leave the market 
(selection effect). Both indicators respond differently to these reallocation effects. 
Model explaining competition developments 
For both indicators, we estimate a model relating competition to a number of explanatory 
variables at the industry level. The model specification includes explanatory variables as: entry, 
exit, market demand, import penetration, advertising and regulatory reforms. The explanatory 
variables are derived from either aggregating firm-level data or from additional data sources 
such as the National Accounts. The results are based on the annual observations of 92 industries 
over the period 1993-2001. 
 
The regression results suggest that regulatory reforms probably intensified competition, but also 
that considerable growth of demand has weakened competition in the period 1993-2001. 
Moreover, although this document finds that entry is likely good for competition, its 
contribution to competition seems to be negligible in the period observed.  
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Overall, the model specification appears to be economically applicable for both competition 
indicators. The puzzling competition pattern and wide variety across industries from 1993 to 
2001 is explainable by a number of explanatory variables. The signs of the estimated 
coefficients of those variables are consistent with theoretical expectations, except for the exit 
rate. Nevertheless, some explanatory variables have statistically insignificant coefficients, 
particularly those of entry and exit rates. 
Implications for policy makers 
Four implications for policy arise from this analysis. First, we find indications that the 
adjustment process of Dutch products market shows signs of inertia. Competition adjusts not 
immediately to changes in the explanatory variables. Moreover, the impact of entry and exit 
seems to be limited. Possible reasons are a lack of firm dynamics in relation with potential entry 
barriers.  
The second issue for policy is that competition can change because of other determinants 
than policy measures. Hence, policy makers should be aware of those determinants that may 
have unintended effects on competition if the latter is used as a source to encourage firms to 
become efficient and innovative. 
Next, both the relative profits measure and the price-cost margin can only be used as sort of 
thermometer to indicate the level of (or change in) competition. Both indicators do no indicate 
why competition has changed, or what the economic effects of such a change are. Moreover, 
they may contradict if reallocation effects are considerable. 
Finally, policy aims to stimulate competition and wants to have the opportunity to monitor 
and to evaluate their competition measures. These types of analyses require detailed 
information. This information is costly as it increases the administrative burden for firms and 
contrasts with the policy to reduce the administrative burden.  
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1  Introduction 
Policy makers took various measures to raise the competitive pressure in product markets 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. International examples are the removal of barriers to the 
internal market of the European Union (EU) in 1992, the policy agenda set by the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000 and WTO-agreements. On top of that, Dutch policy makers renewed 
the Competition Act (‘Mededingingswet’) in 1998. They also reformed regulations in the so-
called MDW-operation to stimulate competition in specific industries, and they privatised 
sectors like telecommunication. 
Policy is concerned about competition, because competition is important for productivity 
and economic growth.
1 Competitive pressure stimulates firms to operate efficiently by, for 
instance, ‘cutting the fat out’ of their organizations. It also brings prices in line with marginal 
costs, lowering the rents of producers and increasing consumer surplus. Vigorous competition 
may therefore result in more productivity as resources and output are allocated to their most 
productive use. Competition also stimulates firms to innovate, which enhances productivity and 
economic growth. However, if competition has become too intense to keep innovation 
profitable, firms may abstain from innovation.  
 
So far, the development of competition in the Netherlands since the early 1990s has hardly been 
investigated at an economy-wide scale. Despite policy interest and some illustrative studies
2, a 
clear overall view on whether or not competition has become fiercer and why, is still an 
unsettled research topic. 
Questions 
This lack of information leads to three key questions: 
·  How has competition changed across Dutch industries between 1993 and 2001? 
·  To what extent can this change in competition be explained? 
·  What are the implications for policy? 
 
 
1 The relation between competition and welfare is not in all cases monotone as competition can induce less product variety 
that may reduce welfare. If consumers prefer product variety, then competition is not conducive to welfare (see Boone, 
2000a). 
2 See Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1998), Boone and Weigand (2000), and Felsö et al., (2001). The former analysed the 
effect of product market competition on productivity in manufacturing. The authors found that competition has a positive 
influence on the level and growth of productivity. Using the RPM, Boone and Weigand analysed the change in competition 
during 1978-1992 in the bread and bakeries and periodical publishing industries. They found that competition fell in 
periodical publishing industries. Felsö et al. analysed competition in a large part of the market sector based on the 
concentration rate only. Their overall findings are indefinite. Competition in manufacturing increases during 1978-1996. In 
construction, retail trade and wholesale trade they could not observe a clear change in competition during the period 1988-
1996.  
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Method 
The first question is addressed with two competition indicators: the price-cost margin 
(abbreviated as PCM) and the recently developed relative profits measure (abbreviated as 
RPM), launched by Boone (2000a). This document shows the results for both indicators at two 
different levels of aggregation. First, we present the competition development for the Dutch 
market sector as a whole during 1993-2001. Here, we come across the issue on how to 
aggregate indicators across industries to provide an overall impression at an aggregated level. 
Whether or not industries compete with each other determines how to aggregate the detailed 
results. Second, we investigate changes in competition at the industry level. Additionally, we 
analyse the coherence of both indicators on the competition development, because the 
indicators may diverge due to the differences in their economic concepts. 
To answer the second question, for both indicators, we use a model that relates competition at 
the industry level to a number of explanatory variables including policy measures, entry and 
exit of firms. Firm-level data are used to take account of firm specific behaviour.  
 
Finally, we derive implications for policy based on the empirical findings.  
Data 
Both competition indicators and some explanatory variables are based on a comprehensive 
firm-level database of approximately 87 000 firms in the Netherlands across 119 industries, 
covering large parts of the Dutch market sector including industries of the manufacturing 
industry, construction, trade, transport and commercial services sector. Other determinants for 
explaining competition are derived from the General Firm Register (in Dutch ABR) and from 
the National Accounts, both from Statistics Netherlands. Appendix A discusses the firm-level 
database and the other data sources in more detail.  
Limitations 
This analysis has a number of restrictions limiting its scope. Data availability limits the analysis 
to the period 1993-2001. Furthermore, it faces commonly known issues working with (firm-
level) data on competition. One traditional limitation, and a notorious problem, concerns the 
issue of the relevant market. We define the relevant markets to be the 3-digit SIC-level at the 
national level. The latter implies that we assume that firms compete within these industries at 
the national level. The empirical evidence could be blurred because firms do not compete at this 
level. The second limitation is that the analysis of this document only focuses on product 
markets neglecting the interrelationship between markets. For instance, recent studies point 
towards strong interactions between regulations at the product market and the labour market 
(see e.g., Nicoletti et al., 2000).   
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Extensive analysis of competition indicators in CPB Memorandum Measuring competition in the Netherlands 
Creusen et al. (2006) compare four types of competition indicators (i.e. RPM, PCM, Herfindahl index and labour-income 
quote) based on two datasets. In fact, they use the firm-level database to analyse the RPM, the PCM and the Herfindahl 
index. The last indicator measures the concentration in market shares. For the market sector as a whole, they also 
compare those indicators with the PCM and the labour-income quote based on the input-output tables of the National 
Accounts. This document investigates only two indicators, but its main conclusions on the development of competition 
are similar to those in the Memorandum.  
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2  Competition in Dutch market sector in 1993-2001 
We measure competition using the RPM and the PCM, both derived from firm-level data. The former 
indicator assumes that fiercer competition leads to relatively more profits for efficient firms. The PCM 
focuses on the market power of firms to set prices above marginal costs. At the aggregated level, the 
intensity of competition in the Dutch market sector probably slightly declined from 1993 to 2001 according 
to both indicators. This decline is partly related to a shift in the industrial structure to services industries 
with on average less intense competition than in manufacturing industries. Neglecting changes in the 
structure, the course of competition is less clear-cut at the industry level. Although competition changes 
have been rather small in most of them, a considerable number of industries experience a sharp rise or 
strong fall in competition. Moreover, at the industry level, the indicators frequently contradict in the 
direction of competition change. These contradictions are probably related to a different response of the 
indicators to a reallocation of output from inefficient to efficient firms.  
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the first research question of this document: 
How has competition changed across Dutch industries between 1993 and 2001? 
 
Before answering the question, we define what competition is and how to measure it. 
Competition is a complex phenomenon and the way to measure competition is still an unsettled 
question in the literature. We regard product market competition as the game between firms on 
product markets in order to maximise their profits. This game is complex as many determinants 
are involved. For instance, firms’ behaviour and their strategic interaction as well as external 
determinants like demand, number of competitors and the prevailing regulation determine the 
firms’ output and prices.  
It is difficult to capture all elements of competition in a single figure. Still, researchers in the 
Industrial Organisation literature suggest measuring competition by using (indirect) indicators.
3 
Following this suggestion, this document applies two indicators of competition: the RPM or the 
RPM, and the price-cost margin or the PCM. 
Section 2.2 discusses both indicators and their measurement. Section 2.3 shows how the 
intensity of competition in the Netherlands evolved over the period 1993-2001. It presents the 
results of competition at two different levels of aggregation: the Dutch market sector as a whole 
 
3 See e.g. Cabral (2000) and for a further elaboration Boone (2000a).  
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and across Dutch industries. Section 2.4 discusses the relation between both competition 
indicators, both conceptually and empirically. Finally, section 2.5 gives some conclusions. 
2.2  Two indicators of competition 
Relative profits measure 
Boone recently developed a new way to measure competition (see Boone, 2000a): the relative 
profits measure (RPM). The idea behind this measure is that fiercer competition leads to 
(relatively) more profits of the high-productive firms at the expense of the low-productive 
firms, as efficient firms are forced to exploit their competitive advantage. Put differently, in a 
more competitive market firms are hurt more severely for being inefficient. The indicator rests 
on the approach that firms in an industry differ in their marginal costs, or stated otherwise, in 
their productivity level as the latter is inversely related to marginal costs. 
Figure 2.1  Product-productivity curves of non-interacting firms 






Fiercer competition can be observed by a steeper slope of the relation between relative profits 
of the firms and their relative levels of productivity. Figure 2.1 illustrates the general 
mechanism when competition changes. The horizontal axis ranks the firms according to their 
efficiency from high to low marginal costs or from low to high in terms of productivity level.  
Line I of figure 2.1 shows the profit-productivity curve, which is the relation between the 
profits of a firm and its productivity level at the initial level of competition. The line slopes  
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upward, which implies that efficient firms earn more profits than less efficient firms do.
4 The 
slope of the curve indicates the extent of competition.  
Now assume that competition intensifies because of an exogenous shock. Increasing the 
competitive pressure induces the highly efficient firms (i.e. firms with an efficiency greater than 
B) to exploit their efficiency advantage more. Therefore, they push aside the less efficient firms 
(firms with efficiency lower than B). Consequently, they earn relatively more profits at the 
expense of the low efficient firms (i.e. reallocation in profits). Firms with a productivity level 
lower than D even start to make losses, and they exit (i.e. selection effect). As a result, the 
profit-productivity line rotates counter-clockwise. Hence, an increase in competition is shown 
by an increase in the average slope from profit-productivity curve I to profit-productivity curve 
II.  
Measurement of RPM 
We estimate the RPM by the (negative) relation between firm’s profit and its marginal costs at the 3-digit level. As data 
on marginal costs are not directly observable, we use the average variable costs as an approximation. Using regression 
techniques, the slope β in the basic relationship estimates the RPM: 
 
it it it c log log e b a p + - =  
 
with i p gross profit of firm i and  i c marginal costs of firm i. A high RPM (=β) corresponds with a high level of competition. 
In fact, β is estimated as an elasticity i.e. percentage increase in profits due to a 1 percent decrease in marginal costs. 
We  approximate  the  firms’  marginal  costs  by  the  average  variable  costs:  the  sum  of  the  purchasing  costs  of 
intermediate products and labour costs, divided by the total sales. In order to estimate the RPM accurately, we adjusted 




It turned out that if we do not control for firm-fixed effects the RPM will not always attain the appropriate theoretical sign.  
 
Comparing the slope of the RPM over time provides an indication how competition developed. 
However, a change in the slope gives no clue on the reasons. It can either be due to (exogenous) 
changes in the institutional settings of the market or to changes in the conduct of firms. 
Moreover, adjustments in institutional settings may generate a second-order effect as it may 
alter the conduct of firms. Therefore, the RPM not only takes into account the exogenous 
effects of competition on specific markets but also changes in the conduct of individual firms 
within these markets. 
 
4 The reasoning in the text holds for a linear profit-productivity curve. More competition appears from a steeper slope of that 
relation. In contrast, the profit-productivity curve in figure 2.1 is S-shaped. The tails have economic significance. Boone 
(2000a) argues that more competition for firms in the high-efficient tail is an incentive for them to develop and launch new 
products and not to improve their production processes. In contrast, firms in the low-efficient tail abstain from innovation at 
all if competition intensifies. The type of innovation is not the topic of this paper, and therefore, the form of profit-productivity 
curve is not essential unless it is not positively related to competition.  
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Price-cost margin 
The price-cost margin (PCM) - also known as ‘Lerner index’- refers to the firm’s ability to set 
its prices above its marginal costs. The idea is that fiercer competition is reflected by lower 
PCMs due to lower prices. If there are many competitors on a market with a low level of 
demand, then competition forces the firms to reduce prices until marginal costs. In case of 
perfect competition, prices are equal to marginal costs. Each individual firm cannot affect the 
prices on the product market. At the other extreme, a monopolist experiences no competition at 
all and thus can set the highest price to maximise profits.
5 In the range from no competition to 
perfect competition, the PCM falls.  
Measurement of PCM 
The PCM of industry j is measured as the (weighted) sum of the PCM of individual firms, each weighted by the firms’ 
market share in output. The PCM of firm i is denoted as  ( ) i i i p c p - , where  i c  represents the marginal costs and 
i p  the price of firm i.
a This document measures the (weighted) industry PCM as (see box for alternative approach): 
































where  ti p  denotes the price of firm i in year t, ti c  its average variable costs,  ti v  total variable costs
b,  ti s value of total 
output, and  ti m  denotes the market share. So, the average variable costs approximate the marginal costs. Finally, note 
that the PCM is calculated directly from the firm-level data, whereas the RPM is the result of an econometric regression. 
 
a
 The PCM can also be derived from identifying parameters of a demand and cost function. Another similar way to measure the PCM is 
an approach initially put forward by Hall to measure the Solow residual and the mark-up (price over marginal costs). Hall pointed out that 
the mark-up can be estimated by using Solow’s equation, differentiating between inputs and exogenous technological progress (see Ahn, 
2002). Several studies have elaborated on this alternative as to overcome econometric issues (see Oliveira Martins et al., 1996)). 
b I.e. the sum of labour costs and the costs of intermediate products. 
 
Data issues 
Both the RPM and the PCM are based on firm-level data derived from the 
‘Productiestatistieken’ (PS) by Statistics Netherlands. For the year 2001, appendix B presents 
the levels of the RPM and the PCM for all 119 industries, and the trend growth of both the 
RPM and the PCM between 1993 and 2001 as indication for the change in competition over 
time. For the remaining of this chapter, we focus on 100 industries as we had to omit 19 
industries due to statistical irregularities in the data for measuring both indicators. 
 
 
5 In case of high economies of scale, a monopoly with a high PCM is sustainable. High investment costs and substantial 
economies of scale by incumbents entail that entry of new firms is not profitable. Also from a social point of view entry is less 
desirable, because total demand and firms’ individual output will be too small in relation to the high investments. In case of 
entry, firms cannot sufficiently benefit from the economies of scale.   
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Besides the limitations on delineating relevant markets (see chapter 1) and statistical 
irregularities, there is one other major problem involved with calculating the RPM and the 
PCM.
6 Both indicators use the marginal costs, but these costs are not directly observable. As is 
standard in the empirical literature, we approximate the firms’ marginal costs by the average 
variable costs. However, this approximation may create a bias in the results for both indicators. 
2.3  Competition development during 1993-2001 
2.3.1  Market sector as a whole  
 
The problem of aggregation 
To get an overall view for the market sector as a whole, it is clear that individual industry 
results must be aggregated. Obviously, competition changes of large industries should have 
more weight than competition changes of small industries. However, the precise definitions of 
the weights depend on how one interprets competition between industries within the market 
sector. 
Two extreme approaches 
We employ two approaches to aggregate competition over industries. First, we assume that 
changes in competition within industries do not affect the industrial structure, and use fixed 
weights to aggregate. The second approach assumes that changes in competition at the industry 
level also affect the industrial structure. Both approaches differ if changes in the industrial 
structure occur, but they increasingly correspond if changes in the structure are smaller (see box 
for the formulas).  
Approach 1: No competition between industries 
The first approach assumes that changes in the level of competition in the market sector entirely 
depend on competition changes of each industry separately. We assume no substitutability of 
products between industries despite changes in the relative prices due to competition. Hence, 
we argue that changes in competition within industries do not affect the industrial structure.  
This approach requires that the industrial structure is fixed to the situation in 1993. 
Therefore, competition growth of the market sector equals the fixed weighted sum of the 
 
6 See Creusen et al. (2006) for a more extensive assessment on the empirical measurement of the indicators.  
  22 
competition level of the industries over time. The 1993 market shares (in terms of turnover) of 
each industry in the market sector are used as fixed weights.
7 
Defining competition growth op the market sector: the formulas 
Given the two approaches, the formulas of the competition growth rates for the market sector are denoted as follows.  
 
Approach 1: No competition between industries 
Competition growth of the market sector in year t is defined as  ( ) 1 - D = t t t c c c
￿
 with 
( ) ∑ =
i i t i t s c c 1993 , , *   
where  it c  denotes the competition intensity of industry i ,  1993 , i s  denotes the share of industry i in the turnover of the 
market sector in 1993. 
 
Approach 2: Competition between industries 
Competition growth of the market sector is defined as  ( ) 1 - D = t t t c c c
￿
 where  ∑ =
i it it t c s c ;  it s denotes the share 
of industry i in the turnover of the market sector and  it c denotes the competition intensity in industry i . This expression 
is  the  sum  of  three  components,  viz.  1)  within  component:  competition  growth  due  to  competition  changes  within 
industries;  2)  between  component:  changes  due  to  shifts  in  the  industrial  structure  and  3)  cross  component:  the 
interdependency  between  changes  in  competition  of  industries  and  changes  of  the  industrial  structure.  The 
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The term  1 1 , - - t t i c c measures the deviation of competition intensity of industry i from competition intensity in the 
market sector in the previous year. 
 
Approach 2: Competition between industries 
A second way to aggregate competition across industries is to assume that differences in 
competition intensities across industries do have real economic consequences. In this case, 
products of industries are to some extent substitutes. Hence, if changes in competition at the 
industry level alter the relative prices between the industries, it also affects the industrial 
 
7 Note that this method does not control for measurement problems regarding comparing levels of competition across 
industries. Indexing the levels of competition of each industry to 1993 is not an adequate solution because the aggregated 
result will then be biased towards an index larger than 1993.  
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structure. This approach can be implemented by using a shift-share analysis. Such analysis 
allows us to decompose competition growth at the aggregated level as follows: 
·  The ‘within-industry component’ includes the competition growth due to changes in 
competition of the industries with weights of the previous year. The economic interpretation 
comes close to the interpretation of competition growth according to approach 1 except that the 
weights are not fixed but flexible.  
·  The ‘between-industry component’ reflects competition changes at the aggregated level due to 
shifts in the industrial structure. If the structure shifts to industries with higher levels of 
competition, then competition in the market sector rises, even if competition within industries 
remains unchanged.  
·  The ‘cross component’ presents the competition development as the product of changes in 
competition across industries and changes in the industrial structure. If both elements are 
positive or negative, they contribute to more competition in the market sector. 
 
Note that the ‘between-industry component’ primarily depends on differences in structural 
economic growth between industries. In general, shifts in the economic structure arise from 
differences in income elasticities across the industries as well as differences in price elasticities 
of demand. The industrial structure also depends on the development of (labour) costs in the 
Netherlands compared with foreign countries. Shifts in competition affect relative prices and 
therefore may also alter the industrial structure but presumably, this effect is small. 
Results according to both approaches 
Table 2.1 presents the average annual growth rates of the Dutch market sector between 1993 
and 2001 according to both approaches.
8 It turns out that both indicators in both approaches 
point to less intensified competition over time. Depending on the indicator and on the 
aggregation approach, competition in the market sector has declined between ½ to 1½ percent 
on average per year.  
 
8 To improve the comparability between the indicators, we have harmonized the developments of the indicators in the 
following way. For each indicator we assume that the index starts at 100 in 1993, so the level of competition in 1993 is the 
starting point. Then the value of the index of the RPM equals its value of the previous year plus the annual percentage 
change of the RPM, because an increase in the RPM entails more competition. The value of the index of the PCM equals its 
value of the previous year divided by the annual percentage change of the PCM, because increases in the PCM would point 
to decreases in competition.  
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Table 2.1  Trends competition growth market sector between 1993 and 2001 
Conditions          Approach 1                    Approach 2 
     
Industrial structure  Fixed to 1993                    Flexible 
    Total    Components 
      Within-industry  Between-industry  Cross 
   
                      Average percentage annual competition growth 
           
RPM  - 0.49  - 1.59  0.28  - 1.76  - 0.09 
PCM  - 1.00  - 1.26  - 0.58  - 0.20  - 0.53 
 
Figures 2.2 (approach 1) and 2.3 (approach 2) show the year-by-year development in 
competition according to both indicators. Note that both figures present an index (1993=100) 
for each competition indicator for which an increase points to more competition (and vice 
versa). As already noticed, the figures reveal that both approaches lead to comparable 
developments for both indicators in the longer run. However, the RPM is relatively more 
volatile than the PCM in the short term. 
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Decomposition competition growth  
The shift-share analysis of approach 2 allows looking at the underlying components of the 
change in competition at the aggregated level. Here, the indicators do not completely agree. The 
within-industry component contributed positively to the overall RPM-result in the period 1993-
2001, whereas this component negatively contributed to the PCM. The indicators cohere with 
respect to the other components.  
The between-industry component is negative for both indicators indicating that a change in 
the industrial structure has contributed to the decrease in competition of the Dutch market 
sector. This particularly holds for the RPM. Apparently, the industrial structure shifted from 
industries with high levels of competition to industries with low levels of competition from 
1993 to 2001. To be more precise, it illustrates the ongoing shift from manufacturing to services 
as the latter sector has a lower level of competition (see table 2.2).  
The cross component is negative for both indicators contributing to a decline in competition 
in the Dutch market sector. Competition especially declined in the fastest growing industries in 
terms of market shares in the market sector. Again, this particularly holds for the PCM. 
Obviously, this statistical outcome does not take into account the determinants in this process. 
Still, if we assume fast growing industries and entry positively correlate than the results could 
indicate that the entry of firms in these industries has been insufficient to give sufficient 
countervailing power with regard to competition.   
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Table 2.2  Competition levels manufacturing industry and services sector, 1993
a 
  Manufacturing  Services sector 
     
                                         Market sector =100 
     
Firm-level data     
RPM  150  54 
PCM  120  73 
 
a
 The (weigthed) average indicators for the manufacturing sector and for the services sector are indexed with as base the (weighted) 
average indicators for the market sector. For the PCM the ratio is reversed, as a higher PCM points to less competition.  
 
2.3.2  Across industries 
 
Here we discuss how competition developed across Dutch industries between 1993 and 2001. 
Figure 2.3 shows the distributions of the growth rates of competition across industries for both 




Overall, both indicators do not suggest that competition increased economy-wide. Instead, they 
show a wide variety in competition developments across industries. Although competition 
changes have been rather small in many industries, a considerable number of industries 
experience a sharp rise or strong fall in competition.  
Figure 2.4  Distribution of competition changes across Dutch industries, 1994-2001 
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This inconclusive picture of competition is puzzling, as beforehand one would at least expect a 
positive impact of the competition enhancing policies referred to in section 1. The outcomes 
including the ones of section 2.3.1 suggest that either these policies have not been effective or 
other determinants have offset the positive impact of these policies. The large variety in 
 
9 The percentage change of competition in each industry is the change of the estimated trend for the whole period 1993-
2001 and not the observed change. The former provides a better impression of the structural development of competition, 
because it corrects for potential outliers in 1993 and 2001.  
  27 
competition changes across industries is a puzzle as well, as common factors like the new 
Competition Act affected all those industries. 
These puzzles hold for both indicators suggesting mutual coherence on the competition 
development between both of them. Nonetheless, taking a closer look at figure 1, the indicators 
do not entirely correspond with each other with respect to the number of industries where 
competition intensified or respectively declined.  
Table 2.3 presents the number of industries and their corresponding market share with an 
increase or a decrease in competition during 1993-2001. Now, differences between both 
indicators become more pronounced. First, according to the PCM, the number of industries with 
a rise in competition exceeds the number with a decline, while the RPM points to a larger 
number of industries with a decline. Second, it shows that, according to the RPM, the majority 
of industries with lower competition have a (slightly) higher market share than the ones with 
fiercer competition. With regard to the PCM, it is just the other way round. Finally, taking into 
account the different outcome of the within-industry component of table 2.1, it suggests that at 
the industry level the indicators not only disagree in a number of cases but also that the 
(absolute) changes in competition differ between both indicators.  
Table 2.3  Competition changes in Dutch industries, 1994-2001
a 
      Industries with fiercer competition        Industries with lower competition 
         
  Number of industries  % market share
a  Number of industries  % market share
a 
         
RPM  41  49  59  51 
PCM  58  53  42  47 
 
a I.e. the sum of market shares in 1993 of the industries in the market sector. 
 
2.4  Matching the indicators by industry 
Indicators based on different concepts 
Although both indicators have much in common, a theoretical assessment points out that the 
indicators may come up with a different story on changes in competition (see Boone, 2000a, 
Boone et al., 2006, and Creusen et al., 2006). This is due to their focus on different aspects of 
competition. The RPM emphasises differences between firms in terms of efficiency levels and 
analyses the impact of efficiency levels on profits. The (weighted) PCM at the industry level, 
however, abstracts from these differences in efficiency, and only focuses on the overall level of 
profits (relative to total industry sales).
10  
 
10 In fact, the (industry) PCM can be rewritten as the sum of firms’ profits relative to the total industry sales.  
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If differences in efficiency among firms are large, the PCM and RPM may disagree in their 
story on competition at the industry level. Changes in the PCM at the industry level are the 
result of changes in the individual PCMs of firms as well as changes in their market shares in a 
specific industry. Suppose competition intensifies for some reason. The increase in competition 
will reduce the PCMs of all individual firms. But it may also raise the market shares of the 
efficient firms at the expense of inefficient firms. As efficient firms have a larger PCM than the 
inefficient firms, the former can lower their margins (or prices) relatively more causing their 
market shares to rise. If the latter (reallocation) effect on PCM is positive and larger than the 
negative individual effects, the PCM at the industry level may rise, suggesting less competition. 
In case of the RPM, such intensified (strategic) interaction between firms entails that efficient 
firms gain higher relative profits at the expense of inefficient firms, which induces an increase 
in the RPM suggesting intensified competition.  
Comparing indicators within industries 
The difference in focus of the RPM and the PCM becomes apparent by comparing the 
indicators per industry. Figure 2.4 plots the average growth rates per industry over the period 
1993-2001 according to the RPM (vertical axis) and the PCM (horizontal axis).  
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If the indicators would agree completely on the change in competition by industry, then the 
figure should show a negative relationship as an increase in the PCM and a decrease in the 
RPM indicate weaker competition (and vice versa). Although a negative relationship is present, 
this relationship is not significant as for many industries the indicators contradict each other on  
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the sign of the change in competition. In fact, in half of all observed industries the indicators do 
not agree on the direction of the change. As stated above, this can be due to considerable 
reallocation of market shares among firms within these industries. 
2.5  Conclusions 
This chapter employs two indicators on the intensity of competition, i.e. the RPM and the PCM. 
The RPM builds on the idea that more competition rewards efficiency, so that efficient firms 
gain (relatively) more profits at the expense of inefficient firms. The PCM denotes that if 
competition is low, firms have less power to set prices above marginal costs (and visa versa).  
 
For the Dutch market sector as a whole, both indicators suggest that competition in the market 
sector has declined during 1993-2001. This conclusion holds for two approaches for 
aggregating individual industry results. The first approach abstracts from differences in the 
level of competition intensity in industries, assuming that these differences have no impact on 
the industrial structure. The second approach assumes that differences in competition intensities 
across industries may have real economic consequences. If industries differ in income 
elasticities or are to some extent substitutable, then changes in national income or relative prices 
between the industries affect the industrial structure. The second approach also reveals that part 
of the decline in competition in the market sector is due to a shift in the industrial structure.  
At the industry level, the indicators point to a wide variety in competition developments. 
Although competition changes have been rather small in many industries, a considerable 
number of industries experience a sharp rise or strong fall in competition in the period 1993-
2001. This inconclusive picture of competition at the industry level is puzzling taking into 
account the expected positive impact of the competition enhancing policies.  
 
Comparing the two indicators per selected industry provides more puzzling results. It turns out 
that the indicators frequently contradict each other on the direction of change in competition per 
industry. Both measures point in the same direction in half of all observed industries. These 
diverging results underline the theoretical notion that in some industries reallocation effects 
may occur, and hence both indicators contradict. In fact, the RPM and the PCM may point to 
opposite directions for the development of competition due to reallocation of output. For 
example, more competition forces efficient firms to conduct more aggressively so that they gain 
market share at the expense of inefficient firms. The RPM and the (weighted) PCM respond 
differently to these reallocation effects. 
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3  Explaining competition over time 
We estimate the impact of a number of explanatory variables on both the RPM and the PCM across Dutch 
industries for each year during 1993-2001. It turns out that strong growth in market demand contributed to 
a decline in competition. Regulatory reforms seemed to have had a positive impact on competition. 
Although entry is good for competition, its contribution to competition has been negligible or even slightly 
negative. The model can substantially explain the development of both indictors. However, several 
determinants have statistically insignificant coefficients, particularly those of entry and exit. 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the second question of this document: 
To what extent can the development in competition be explained? 
 
The answer to this question may shed more light on the large variety in competition 
development across industries and to differences between the indicators at the industry level. 
Therefore, for both indicators we estimate a model that explains competition out of a number of 
explanatory variables for the period 1993-2001.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the model, and section 3.3 
presents the estimation results of the model for both indicators. Section 3.4 presents the 
contributions of the explanatory variables on the change in competition. Section 3.5 analyses 
the entry and exit results in more detail, because those results are puzzling. Section 3.6 draws 
some main conclusions.  
3.2  Model explaining competition 
3.2.1  Dependent and explanatory variables
11 
Theory, particularly the theory of Industrial Organization
12, has put forward several 
determinants of competition. In general, competition can become more intense in two ways. 
First, the number of firms can increase given the conduct of firms. The number of firms 
increases due to lower entry costs and new business opportunities. Second, competition 
intensifies if firms' conduct becomes more aggressive given the number of firms. Changes in 
competition policy may also initiate both ways. Hence, the determinants of competition are 
related to the market structure of industries, conduct of firms and policy issues. 
 
11 The data sources are mentioned in appendix A. 
12 See for example Tirole (1988).  
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To explain the RPM and the PCM at the industry level, our model specification includes the 
following explanatory variables: entry and exit of firms to the market, market demand, import 
penetration, strategic interaction between firms, advertising and competition policy measures. 
Finally, it can be argued that competition adjusts not immediately to changes in the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, we also add the competition level of the previous year to the model.  
Entry rate 
More entry of firms to a market is expected to have a positive impact on competition. For 
instance, lower entry barriers or increased demand attracts more entrants. Given the conduct of 
incumbents, this will raise competition. The explanatory variable is the number of firms that 




More exit of firms from a market is expected to have a negative impact on competition. Tighter 
security or environmental requirements or lower demand may force firms to exit the market 
reducing the intensity of competition. The explanatory variable is the number of firms that exit 
an industry in a year as percentage of the total number of firms at the beginning of that year.  
 
Market demand 
An increase in market demand (linked to economic growth) is expected to reduce competition, 
and vice versa. Then, incumbent firms can (at least temporarily) set their prices above marginal 
costs and gain high profits without being impeded by competitors’ price-cutting. Hence, higher 
demand is expected to weaken competition. 
The explanatory variable is real gross product after an adjustment.
13 The adjustment is 
determined by using instrumental variables to control for supply-side effects in the changes of 
total sales. Supply-side effects include labour productivity and the number of firms. 
 
Import penetration 
An increase in international trade intensifies competition between firms operating in different 
countries. In fact, the opening of the European market reduced transportation and transaction 
costs, and consequently raised international trade. The explanatory variable is the share of 




13 (The year-index of) the value of total industry sales is deflated by the GDP-price index to remove disturbances of general 
inflation. 
14 Note that lower transportation costs makes (physical) entry and direct investments of foreign firms on the Dutch market 
less urgent reducing the extent of import penetration. Still, lower transportation costs entail more intense competition.  
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Strategic interaction 
If firms compete more aggressively than competition is expected to be fiercer. Responses of 
firms to competitors’ actions cannot be observed in our dataset. However, there is a way out if 
we include differences between both competition indicators as an explanatory variable. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, if the RPM and the PCM differ in their sign of competition 
change this may point to changes in conduct suggesting intensifying strategic interaction as 
efficient firms use their (cost) advantage at the expense of inefficient firms.
15 These responses 
in behaviour induce lower PCMs for each firm but also reallocation effects of output within 
industries increasing the market shares of efficient firms. The RPM will register the result of 
both effects as an increase in competition, whereas the PCM may register it as a decrease in 
competition at the industry level. 
The explanatory variable is a counting variable. This variable increases (decreases) in some 
year by one if in that year both the RPM and the PCM increase (decrease), suggesting a change 
in intensity of strategic interaction. 
 
Advertising  
The second explanatory variable referring to the conduct of firms is transparency approximated 
by advertising. Its impact on competition is, however, ambiguous. In fact, advertising can raise 
competition if it increases market transparency, but it may also reduce competition if it lowers 
product substitutability and effectively raises an entry barrier.  
On the one hand, firms may use advertising to introduce new products and to inform clients 
on the product attributes increasing the transparency. In this way, advertising may enhance 
competition. On the other hand, lack of transparency on product quality may hinder 
competition. Transparency issues particularly hold in the (business) services sector (see Kox, 
2002), as clients are not easily able to judge on the quality before or even just after the purchase 
of the service. Clients can only build on firms’ reputation.
16 Building up a strong reputation of 
supplying high-quality products is a difficult, lengthy and costly process. This gives incumbents 
an initial advantage over entrants. Additionally, incumbents may also use advertising to reduce 
product substitutability. Here, advertising expenditures have a negative impact on competition. 
The explanatory variable is the expenditures on advertising as percentage of the sales.  
 
 
15 Firms’ interactions may intensify because of increases in product substitutability, lower market demand, diminishing 
response of competitors to an offensive action, and a shift from (lax) quantity competition to (fierce) price competition (see 
Boone, 2000).  
16 In some cases, customers even have to pay search cost to select the most appropriate product.  
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Regulatory reforms 
Regulatory reforms are supposed to have intensified competition in the observed period in the 
Netherlands. Empirically these effects are difficult to capture in measurable variables (see 
OECD, 2005). 
The explanatory variable is a counting variable on regulation as the sum of two elements. The 
first one is the impact of the MDW-operation (Competition, Deregulation and Legislative 
quality): several partial MDW-projects resulted in policy reforms that changed competitive 
conditions in specific industries; e.g., the MDW-operation resulted in the enactment of the new 
shop hours act in 1996 (liberalization of the shop opening hours) and the new taxi-act in 2000 
(deregulation of the taxi-market). The second one is the impact of the new Competition Act in 
1998 (in Dutch Mededingingswet), which may have affected competition in all industries. 
When a policy reform was enacted in a year than the counting variable increases with one for 
that same year. 
Lagged competition indicator 
We expect that competition intensity does not adjust instantaneously to changes in the 
explanatory variables. The delay can be due to firms’ inertia and refers to the gradual 
adjustment of firms’ competitive behaviour to changes in competitive settings. This feature is 
well known for other economic variables such as capital. The explanatory variable is the one-
year lagged dependent variable (RPM respectively PCM).  
Sector dummies 
Finally, to cope with heterogeneity and different markets, we control for differences between 
industries by adding sectoral dummies to the competition equation. As table 2.2 illustrates, the 
level of competition is higher in manufacturing than in the services sector. The explanatory 
variables are two dummies: one for all industries belonging to the services sector and one for all 
industries belonging to the construction sector. Moreover, we test for further segmentation of 
the markets. 
3.2.2   Estimation procedure 
We estimated the model using the observations of 92 industries over the period from 1993 to 
2001. We left out 27 industries, because for these industries data on the explanatory variables 
were missing for several years.  
Before discussing the estimation results for competition, we embark on the specific relationship 
between competition, entry and exit. This relationship is not straightforward because of the 
endogeneity problem.  
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Formal model and used estimation technique 
The model exists of simultaneous equations for competition, entry and for exit. We estimated this simultaneous model 
for both competition indicators separately, i.e. the RPM and the PCM. 
 
The  main  equation  explains  the  development  in  competition.  After  taking  logarithms  of  the  respective  competition 
indicator  tj tj tj PCM , RPM CI =  as the dependent variable and all the explanatory variables of industry j in year t, the 
regression equation for competition reads as: 
tj tj tj tj tj tj λ RR α SI α ADV α MD α Exit α Entry α α CI + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0                                                                      (1) 
with   Entry   estimated number of entrants as percentage of total number of firms 
         Exit      estimated number of exiting firms as percentage of the total number of firms 
        MD       market demand, i.e. total sales adjusted for supply-side effects 
        ADV     advertising rate, i.e. advertising costs as percentage of total sales 
        SI         dummy on strategic interaction
 a 
        RR       indicator on regulatory reforms, i.e. the sum of a dummy on a MDW-operation (1996 and later)  
                    and a dummy on the new Competition Act (1998 and later) 
 
The fitted values of the entry and exit rate ( tj Entry and  tj Exit ) capture the joint effects of all determinants on competition 
that go through entry and exit. Using the 2-Stage Least Squares approach, these predicted values are obtained from 
two other equations, because entry and exit may be endogenous variables. Therefore, we separately determined the 
impact of several exogenous determinants on entry and exit by regressing the entry rate ( tj Entry ) and exit rate ( tj Exit ) 
of industry j in year t on lagged determinants. We used a one year lag, because it is likely that entry and exit only take 
place whenever the change in the determinant becomes more settled and definite.
b Stated formally, we estimated: 
tj ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t- ,j t tj µ RR β ADV β DEP β TS β CI  β Entry β β Entry + + + + + + + = - - - - - 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0   (2a)   
tj ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t ,j t- ,j t tj ν RR γ ADV γ DEP γ TS γ CI γ Exit γ γ Exit + + + + + + + = - - - - - 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 0 0                                                          (2b) 
with TS      total sales 
       DEP    capital intensity, measured by depreciation costs as percentage of total sales 
 
The equations can be estimated in two sequential steps by the Ordinary Least Squares-technique. This procedure is 
known as the 2-Stage Least Squares-technique to correct for endogeneity problems (see for example Verbeek, 2004).  
 
a
 A positive and significant correlation between the RPM and the PCM points to the existence of reallocation effects, i.e. when changes in 
competition also induce shifts in market shares (see Creusen et al., 2006). These reallocation effects, however, typically emerge if 
competition is altered by changes in strategic interaction. So, simultaneous increases (decreases) in the RPM and the PCM point to an 
increase (decrease) in firm’s strategic interaction. 
b Note that these lagged variables eventually serve as instrumental variables for the system of all equations. 
 
Entry affects competition as more entry will have a positive effect on competition. However, on 
its turn, competition also affects entry. Intensified competition reduces profits and given the 
fixed costs entrants do not enter the market. Theoretically, it is not straightforward how to 
interpret changes in the number of firms in a market with regard to competition. In fact, it may  
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depend on the causes of a change in competition. For instance, the number of firms may 
increase due to lower entry barriers, attracting more entry, which points to more competition. In 
contrast, the number of firms may decline if more aggressive conduct of firms enhances 
competition, for example due to regulatory reforms, forcing (inefficient) firms to leave the 
market.  
Therefore, we control for simultaneity between the competition indicators and entry and 
exit. In fact, we use the fitted values of entry and exit rates in the explanation of competition 
(see box on the formal model). The fitted values are calculated from additional equations for 
entry and exit using instrumental variables.
17   
3.3  Estimation results for competition  
Dependent variable: RPM 
Table 3.1 presents the estimated coefficients as well as the expected sign of each explanatory 
variable of the RPM (equation (1) in the formal model). 
The model explains a considerable part of the variety in competition across industries. The 
goodness of fit (R-squared) is considerable: the determinants explain 62% of the variation of 
competition. However, it should be noted that the lagged competition indicators substantially 
contribute to this value. Nevertheless, the strongly significant t-value of the lagged indicator 
puts no burden on the explanatory power of the regression as a whole, because omitting the 
lagged indicator does not harm the sign or the significance of the other determinants.  
The estimated coefficients of five determinants are statistically significant, i.e. those of the 
market demand, import penetration, the strategic interaction, the regulatory reforms, and the 
lagged competition indicator. Additionally, the model specification appears to be economically 
applicable. The signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are consistent with 
theoretical expectations, except for the exit rate. For instance, the estimated coefficients suggest 
that market demand has had a negative effect on competition, and regulatory reforms have had a 
positive effect on competition in the period 1993-2001.
18  
Given our model specification, the result for the exit rate is puzzling, since it suggests that more 
exits have had a positive effect on competition. However, the associated t-values indicate that 
the hypothesis of a zero (or negative) effect cannot be rejected.
19 In section 3.5, we elaborate on 
the entry and exit results in more detail. 
 
17 The fitted values of the entry rate and the exit rate are based on the estimated coefficients of equations (2a) or (2b), and 
the observed explanatory variables.  
18 Differentiating between the new Competition Act and the specific reforms by the MDW-operation does not alter the 
message, because both reforms have had a positive impact on competition (see appendix C). 
19 Critical t-value for a twofold test at 10% confidence level is 1.65; at 5% confidence level is 1.96.  
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Table 3.1  Explanation of competition by regressing the RPM, 1994-2001 
Determinants
            Expected sign
a  Estimated coefficient  t-value 
       
 (Fitted) entry  +   0.06  0.41 
 (Fitted) exit  -   0.35  1.25 
 Market demand  -  – 0.31  – 2.38 
 Import penetration  +  0.05  2.42 
Strategic interaction  +  0.08  5.38 
Advertising rate  ?  0.01  0.37 
Indicator regulatory reforms  +  0.08  2.12 
       
Lagged RPM    0.44  12.85 
       
Dummy construction sector    – 0.87  – 4.13 
Dummy services sector    – 0.65  – 5.35 
       
Intercept    – 0.22  – 0.41 
       
R- squared    0.62   
Degrees of freedom    693   
Durbin’s h-statistic    - 1.68   
F-value    115.33   
 
a
 Positive coefficient indicates positive effect on competition, and visa versa. 
 
Next, we highlight three additional results of table 3.1. First, the statistically significant 
coefficient of the indicator for strategic interaction suggests that competition increased due to 
changes in the behaviour of (efficient) firms. It, therefore, supports the idea that reallocation of 
market shares between firms has been important in the period 1993-2001. Hence, different 
signals on the change in competition between both indicators could be related to this 
reallocation effect.  
Second, the size of the coefficient of lagged indicator suggests an adjustment of firms’ 
competitive behaviour to changes in the other determinants in the previous year. The coefficient 
of 0.44 implicates that competition is fully adjusted to initial changes of other determinants 
after two years. 
Finally, higher advertising expenditures intensify competition, suggesting that those 
expenditures increase market transparency and, consequently, increase the competitive pressure. 
However, the coefficient of advertising is statistically insignificant.   
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Additional econometric issues 
Other model specifications did not improve the overall findings or the significance of estimated parameters. 
First, we have also estimated the equation with other variable-specifications, such as annual percentage changes, 
adjustments for industry specific factors or with lagged variables. These estimations all ended in  poorer results in 
statistical sense as well as economic sense. 
Second, correlations between the determinants point to some multi-collinearity or heteroskedasticity. Particularly, the 
predicted entry correlates with the predicted exit. Both variables also correlate with the dummy for services. Adjusting 
the regressions for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation does not fundamentally change the overall findings. 
Third, we controlled for differences in the number of firms per industry as indication for separate markets. Again, it 
turned out that this diversification did not change the overall results. 
 
Dependent variable: PCM 
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for the PCM as the dependent variable. Remember that 
the signs of the explanatory variables for RPM should be mostly opposite to the ones for the 
PCM, because the two indicators measure changes in competition in the opposite way. The only 
exceptions are the parameters of the lagged indicators, the indicator on strategic interaction due 
to its definition, and the advertising expenditures as for the latter, the sign is beforehand not 
clear-cut. 
Table 3.2  Explanation of competition by regressing the PCM , 1994-2001 
Determinant
            Expected sign
a  Estimated coefficient  t– value 
       
(Fitted) entry rate  -   – 0.15  – 1.58 
(Fitted) exit rate  +   – 0.21  – 1.25 
Market demand  +  0.16  1.94 
Import penetration  -   – 0.01  – 1.05 
Strategic interaction  +  0.03  3.60 
Advertising rate  ?   0.02  0.94 
Indicator regulatory reforms  -   – 0.06  – 2.48 
       
Lagged PCM  +  0.84  36.75 
       
Dummy construction sector    0.07  0.59 
Dummy services sector    0.20  2.87 
       
Intercept    0.45  1.35 
       
R-squared    0.79   
Degrees of freedom    687   
Durbin’s h-statistic    - 5.46   
F-value    254.01   
 
a
 Negative coefficient indicates positive effect on competition, and visa versa. 
 
The results for the PCM are in line with the findings for the RPM. The signs of the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables are consistent with theoretical expectations, except for the exit rate. 
Hence, the model specification appears to be also economically relevant for the PCM as well.  
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The similarity in regression results indicates the robustness of the explanatory variables, 
although fewer determinants are significant. Nonetheless, two main differences occur between 
both indicators: 1) the sign of advertising on competition differs, 2) the long-term parameters.  
First, the negative impact of advertising on the PCM suggests that advertising is used as a 
mean to reduce competition instead of more competition in the case of the RPM. However, an 
alternative interpretation is that efficient firms have used their advertising expenditures to 
demonstrate their competitive advantage thereby increasing market transparency, resulting in 
relatively higher profits and market shares of those efficient firms increasing the overall PCM at 
the industry level. 
Second, the coefficients of the lagged competition indicator differ considerably between the 
RPM and the PCM. The adjustment process is much slower according to the PCM-model. But 
again, omitting the lagged PCM as an explanatory variable does not affect the significance of 
the other determinants. 
3.4  Contribution explanatory variables to competition change 
Dependent variable: RPM 
Hitherto, we focused on the econometric results with respect to the sign and significance of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. This section presents the contributions of the 
determinants to the overall change of both indicators over the period 1995-2001.  
Table 3.3  Contributions determinants to change in RPM, 1995-2001
a 
Determinant  Long Term-parameter  Average annual % change
 
Contribution 
       
Dependent variable: RPM    – 0.12   
       
(Fitted) entry rate  0.11  – 0.09  – 0.01 
(Fitted) Exit rate
  0.62  – 1.41  – 0.88 
Market demand  – 0.56  1.91  – 1.07 
Import penetration  0.09  0.93  0.08 
Strategic interaction  0.15  – 3.64  – 0.54 
Advertising  0.02  – 2.03  – 0.04 
Indicator regulatory reforms  0.15  16.30  2.41 
       
Explained      – 0.04 
Unexplained      – 0.08 
 
a
 Results based on aggregation of industries with fixed industry weights 1994. For regulatory reforms the average difference per year, 
because in the regression the indicator of regulatory reforms is included as a straight variable, not as a variable in logarithm like all other 
exogenous and endogenous variables. 
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Those contributions are based on their long term (Long Term-parameter) estimated coefficient
20 
and their overall change at the aggregated level. As most variables are in logarithms, the 
coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity: percentage change in competition due to a one 
percent increase of a determinant. For instance, if the import penetration rises with 10%, 
competition according to the RPM will become 0.9% higher (see table 3.3). 
 
The contributions suggest that the decline in competition is partly caused by considerable 
growth of market demand. In fact, firms did not have to compete aggressively in order to attain 
sufficient sales and profits. Regulatory reforms likely reinforced competition. An overall impact 
of the entry rate, however, was absent despite favourable business opportunities. Hence, 
incumbents have hardly been threatened by entrants. We discuss the finding for the strategic 
interaction at the same time as the results for the PCM.  
Dependent variable: PCM 
Likewise, table 3.4 presents the contributions of all explanatory variables to the development of 
the PCM. As the model includes the same explanatory variables, the contributions have similar 
effects on competition except for advertising and for strategic interaction.  
Table 3.4  Contributions of determinants to change in PCM, 1995-2001
a
  
Determinant  Long Term-parameter  Average annual % change
 
Contribution 
       
Dependent variable: PCM    – 0.98   
       
(Fitted) entry rate  – 0.89  – 0.15  0.13 
(Fitted) exit rate
  – 1.26  – 1.48  1.86 
Market demand  0.96  1.72  1.66 
Import penetration  – 0.08  0.56  – 0.05 
Strategic interaction  0.21  – 3.82  – 0.79 
Advertising  0.12  – 2.26  – 0.27 
Indicator regulatory reforms  – 0.36  15.99  – 5.74 
       
Explained      – 3.20 
Unexplained      2.21 
 
a
 Results based on aggregation of industries with fixed industry weights 1994. For regulatory reforms the average difference per year, 
because in the regression the indicator of regulatory reforms is included as a straight variable, not as a variable in logarithm like all other 
exogenous and endogenous variables. 
 
Section 3.3 already discussed the discrepancy between the RPM and the PCM in advertising. 
Here, we elaborate on the findings for the strategic interaction. This indicator picks up 
differences between both indicators with respect to competition. These differences are related to 
 
20 Actually, the long term parameters are derived from the error correction model. It can be estimated by multiplying the short 
term parameters (second column in table 3.1 and table 3.2) with the lag-multiplier, which is related to the parameter of the 
lagged RPM (1/(1-0.44)) respectively the lagged PCM (1/(1-0.84)).  
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the reallocation effect of output. As the overall contribution to the RPM is negative, the model 
suggests that firms reacted less aggressively to each other after 1993.  
Recent developments 
Availability of firm-level data limits our analysis to the early 2000s. Recent developments can be deducted from other 
sources.  For  instance,  one  can  use  the  PCM  and  labour  income  ratio  derived  from  National  Accounts  data  as 
competition indicators as well (see Creusen et al., 2006). The most recent National accounts provide data for the year 
2004. Both alternative indicators suggest that competition did not significantly increase even during the downturn in the 
business cycle. The period 1993-2001 covered a cyclical upswing, but thereafter, economic growth fell back. Taking 
account  of  the  negative  relationship  between  (excess)  market  demand  and  competition,  a  clear  revival  of  the 
competitive pressure was to be expected ceteris paribus other determinants. 
 
3.5  Development of entry and exit rates 
The estimation results of section 3.3 in explaining competition point to remarkable results on 
the impact of entry and exit on competition. The estimated coefficients of the (fitted) exit rate 
point to a positive effect on competition, which contrasts with the theoretical expectation. The 
estimated coefficients of the (fitted) entry rate are insignificant, particularly in case of the RPM.  
This section explicitly investigates the development of the entry and exit rate over the period 
1993-2001. First, we start with a brief discussion on the observed development of entry and exit 
during the period of investigation. Next, we elaborate on the explanation of the exit rate as well 
as the entry rate.  
Observations on entry and exit 1993-2001 
The total number of firms in the Dutch market sector gradually increased from 1993 to 2001 
from approximately 400 thousand to almost 500 thousand firms (see figure 3.1).
21 Hence, the 
number of entrants is higher than the number of exiting firms over time. The entry rate - the 
number of entrants as percentage of the number of firms in a particular year - has been rather 
stable over time. Hence, there seems to be no fundamental change in the aggregated entry rate 
in the period 1993-2001 despite the business cycle and changes in the regulatory reforms. In 
contrast, the exit rate is more volatile than the entry rate and seems to be inversely related to the 
business cycle. The exit rate rose until 1996 but declined afterwards in line with the upsurge in 
the Dutch economy. 
 
21 Note that these figures refer to the observed industries and not to the total economy.  
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exit rate (left axis) entry rate (left axis) number of firms (right axis)
% of number of firms number of firms (x1000)
 
a
 I.e. for those industries for which data on the number of firms are available for all years. 
b
 Total number of firms refers to the average of the number of firms at the start of each year and the number at the end of 
each year. 
Source: ABR, Statistics Netherlands 
 
Model specification 
The fitted values of the entry and exit rate are derived from the explanation of the observed 
entry rate and exit rate. As discussed in section 3.2.2, to handle the endogeneity problem, we 
estimate both entry and exit separately by using almost all lagged determinants as the model 
specification for competition. Exceptions are capital intensity, sales
22 and strategic interaction.  
First, we added capital intensity (depreciation costs as a percentage of total sales) to the 
entry and exit equations. A high level of capital intensity or put it loosely, substantial 
economies of scale may act as an entry barrier for new firms to enter the market. Exogenous 
changes in capital costs might lower these entry barriers stimulating firm dynamics and 
eventually competition. Capital intensity may also serve as an exit barrier. For incumbents, 
capital may partly entail sunk costs and cannot be sold due to their uniqueness. In that case, 
incumbents are tied to their sunk capital and will be impeded to exit the market. 
Strategic interaction is excluded from the entry and exit equations. As the lagged RPM and 
the PCM also refer to the impact of previous changes in competition on entry and exit, these 
explanatory variables will be correlated with the indicator on strategic interaction. Hence, the 
 
22 Instead of market demand, we use total (deflated) sales as both entry and exit depend on developments of the total 
market.  
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impact of strategic interaction on entry and exit can only be determined by using more 
advanced techniques, but that is beyond the scope of this document.   
Estimation results 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the expected sign and estimates of the coefficients of each explanatory 
variable on entry respectively on exit.  
Table 3.5  Estimation results of entry rate, 1994-2001 
Estimated with           RPM         PCM 
           
Determinants  Expected sign  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
           
Lagged total sales (deflated)  +  0.64  6.87  0.64  6.88 
Lagged capital intensity/depreciation  -  – 0.04  – 1.97  – 0.04  – 1.78 
Lagged advertising rate  -  – 0.11  – 4.89  – 0.10  – 4.05 
Lagged indicator regulatory reforms  +  – 0.21  – 6.92  – 0.21  – 6.84 
           
Lagged RPM   -  0.03  0.90     
Lagged PCM   +      – 0.03  – 0.83 
           
Lagged entry  +  0.05  4.75  0.05  4.71 
           
Dummy construction sector    0.34  2.69  0.29  2.54 
Dummy services sector    0.45  8.47  0.42  9.72 
           
Intercept    – 0.61  – 1.40  – 0.64  – 1.44 
           
R-squared    0.31    0.31   
Degrees of freedom    705    703   
 
Table 3.6  Estimation results of exit rate, 1994-2001 
Estimated with        RPM         PCM 
           
Determinants  Expected sign
  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
           
Lagged total sales (deflated)  -  0.08  0.93  0.07  0.84 
Lagged capital intensity/depreciation  -  - 0.04  – 2.00  – 0.04  – 2.39 
Lagged advertising rate  -  - 0.00  – 0.02  – 0.01  – 0.58 
Lagged indicator regulatory reforms  +  – 0.12  – 4.48  – 0.12  – 4.43 
           
Lagged RPM   +  0.00  0.15     
Lagged PCM   -      0.04  1.38 
           
Lagged exit  +  0.02  3.43  0.02  3.48 
           
Dummy construction sector    – 0.17  – 1.50  – 0.18  – 1.72 
Dummy services sector    0.31  6.37  0.29  7.33 
           
Intercept    1.82  4.60  1.97  4.92 
           
R-squared    0.17    0.17   
Degrees of freedom    701    699    
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First, a note of a warning, the R-squared indicates a small fit for a level equation. Nonetheless, 
most of the signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are consistent with our 
expectations, except for the competition indicators and the regulatory reforms. For instance, 
changes in total sales are significant and positively related to entry as favourable business 
opportunities attract new firms. Further, entry is significant and negatively related to capital 
intensity and advertising, whereas higher capital intensity negatively correlates with exit. These 
findings do not reject the existence of entry and exit barriers.  
As said, two results are opposite to our expectations: i.e. competition indicators and the 
regulatory reforms. Both results need further consideration but that is beyond the scope of this 
study.   
3.6  Conclusions 
This chapter presents the regression results of the model which explains the development of the 
RPM and PCM across industries during 1993-2001. The econometric analysis suggests that 
regulatory reforms indeed intensified competition, but also that considerable growth of market 
demand may have weakened competition. Moreover, we find indications for a lack of firm 
dynamics as well, with a puzzling impact of regulatory reforms on entry and exit. During the 
second half of the 1990s, demand grew considerably reducing the extent of competition. In 
principle, incumbents gained more returns, making competition among them less intense. These 
higher profits and better business opportunities, however, did not generate sufficiently firm 
dynamics in terms of attracting new firms to the market and forcing firms to leave the market.  
 
These findings do not differ whether the RPM is used as indicator of competition or the PCM. 
Overall, the model specification appears to be economically relevant for both indicators as large 
part of their variation is explained. The signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are 
generally consistent with theoretical expectation. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that part of 
the differences between the RPM and PCM could be related to the reallocation effect of output.  
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4  Implications for policy 
The analysis has four implications for policy. First, we find indications that the adjustment process on the 
Dutch market shows signs of inertia. Possible reasons are a lack of firm dynamics in relation with 
potential entry barriers. The second implication is that competition can change in unintended directions 
because of other determinants. Hence, policy should be aware of those determinants. Third, both 
competition indicators have shortcomings. Finally, to some extent a trade-off arises between the aim to 
increase competition and the aim to reduce the administrative burden for firms.  
Four implications arise from the preceding analysis: 
Implication 1: Insufficient adjustment process of entry and exit 
We argue that the adjustment process on (particular) Dutch product markets likely shows signs 
of inertia and thus be of concern for policy. There seems to be a lack of (firm) dynamics and/or 
entry barriers. The (effect of) net entry on competition seems to be too small given the 
favourable business cycle in the course of the 1990s. This can be due to limited number of 
entrants (see figure 3.1) or that entrants do not really compete with incumbents due to product 
differentiation, existence of niches or economies of scale (see Kox et al., 2006). Hence, 
incumbents on those markets may sustain longer periods of supranormal profits with consumer 
prices deviating from competing prices.
23 In that respect, it is noteworthy that the regulatory 
reforms had a negative effect on both entry and exit at the industry level instead of the expected 
positive effect. This finding is puzzling and needs further consideration.  
Implication 2: Be aware of other effects 
Regulatory reforms has likely had a positive impact on the intensity of competition in the period 
observed. The analysis in the previous chapter illustrates, however, that competition can be due 
to other (exogenous) determinants as well. In fact, fierce demand reduced the competitive 
pressure. Hence, policy should be aware of other determinants that may have unintended effects 
on competition. Needless to say that competition is a source for enhancing welfare, so welfare 
should be a target for policy and not competition itself.  
Implication 3: Both indicators have shortcomings 
This document employs the relative profits measure and the price-cost margin as indicators for 
competition. Both indicators have their (theoretical) weaknesses. Not every aspect of 
competition seems to be fully accountable by them. Particularly, the behaviour of firms, for 
 
23 See Bain (1951 and 1956), referred in Tirole (1988).  
  46 
instance, in terms of collusion or price discrimination, is difficult to get under control in 
empirics (see Creusen et al., 2006).  
The indicators are also based on different concepts. As a result, they may in some cases point to 
diverging directions on the change in competition (see section 2.4). Creusen et al. (2006) 
explores this issue in more detail. 
Further, the competition measures can only act as a sort of thermometer. Each indicator 
provides an indication of the competition intensity or the change in it. However, monitoring and 
evaluating the extent of competition require additional information on the determinants that 
could have had an effect on competition. Changes in competition may be due to changes in 
institutional settings, but other determinants such as the business cycle and consumer behaviour 
may affect the extent of competition as well.  
 
So, to deal with these shortcomings to some extent, it is preferable to use more indicators at 
once and to investigate the impact of several determinants to get a better impression of 
competition issues. 
Implication 4: Trade-off between competition and administrative burden 
To some extent a trade-off arises between the aim to increase competition and to reduce the 
administrative burden for firms. On the one hand, policy wants to reduce the administrative 
burden of legislation and regulation for firms, particularly for small and medium sized firms. 
On the other hand, policy tries to stimulate competition and wants to have the opportunity to 
monitor and to evaluate their competition measures. These types of analyses require detailed 
information. This information is costly as it increases the administrative burden for firms and 
contrasts with the policy to reduce the administrative burden. 
Moreover, although Dutch firm-level surveys of Statistics Netherlands contain a tremendous 
amount of interesting information, additional information is indispensable if one wants to get a 
grip on the competitive behaviour of firms. Particularly, information on firm-level prices and 
product differentiation is needed.
24  
This research was explicitly confronted with the borders of analysing firm-level data for the 
Netherlands. Due to cutback in samples and other changes, the availability and quality of these 
types of data have been substantially under pressure. Moreover, confidentiality sometimes 
forbids researchers to examine certain industries due to (threshold) restrictions of Statistics 
Netherlands. These unobservable industries may include industries that would be very 
interesting from a competitive point of view.  
 
 
24 Note also that e.g. the RPM does not explicitly take into account issues as collusion, mergers, predation and first mover 
advantages. Information on these issues should also be collected to assess the intensity of competition in a market.  
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Appendix A  Data 
Both indicators based on firm-level data set  
The RPM and the PCM are based on firm-level data. These data are derived from the yearly 
survey among enterprises carried out for the ‘Productiestatistieken’ (PS) by Statistics 
Netherlands. The survey gives complete coverage of firms with at least 20 employees, while 
firms with fewer than 20 employees are sampled.
25 However, unprocessed firm-level data can 
be erratic. In order to obtain reliable firm-level data, several cleaning activities are necessary at 
the outset. We employed the following five sequential cleaning activities to our dataset: 1) firms 
with no turnover and/or no employment were neglected; 2) firms with a negative value added 
were also deleted; 3) firms with a turnover less than labour costs were removed; 4) firms with 
identical output and employment data in two consecutive years were ignored; 5) firms with 
huge changes in key variables as output and employment were also removed from the dataset. 
 
Eventually, the firm-level database contains information of 87 000 firms in the Netherlands 
across 119 industries at the 3-digit SIC-level.
26 Table A.1 presents an overview of the main 
sectors where data are available. The dataset covers a large part of the Dutch market sector.
27 
This document cannot observe the agriculture and fishing industry, banking and insurance, 
public utilities and health care industries, because of a lack of data. This document focuses on 
the period 1993-2001 since for this period the largest consistent firm-level dataset is available. 
Table A.1 Overview of available data for selected industries 
Sector  SIC-code  Period 
     
Manufacturing  151-366  1978-2001 
Construction  45  1982-2001 
Retail  52  1988,1990,1992-2001 
Wholesale  50-51  1988,1990-2001 
Transport  6  1993-2001 
Other services  55, 7  1989-2001 
 
 
25 The raising factors are used to generate population results. 
26 SIC stands for the “Standaard Bedrijfsindeling”, the 1993 version of Statistics Netherlands. 
27 Note, that not every industry within manufacturing or services is included in the PS as well. For instance, for the transport 
sector no information is available for industries like railways. In addition, firms belonging to the financial and insurance 
industries are lacking.  
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Data sources of explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables are drawn from the following three data sources: 
·  The firm-level database, which provides the advertising rate (advertising expenditures as a 
percentage of total sales) and the capital intensity (depreciation costs as a percentage of total 
sales).  
·  General Firm Register (in Dutch: “Algemeen BedrijfsRegister”, ABR) provides the data on the 
number of firms and entry and exit. This database contains information for each firm on its SIC-
code, its date of birth and its date of death (if relevant). From these figures, we can determine 
the total number of firms for each observed industry, as well as the entry and exit rate.
28  
·  National Accounts. From this source we extract those explanatory variables that cannot be 
derived from the previous sources. It concerns the import penetration (total imports as a 
percentage of total sales on the Dutch market) as well as the market demand at the industry 
level. The latter is determined by adjusted total sales on the Dutch market (national for supply 
effects such as increases productivity growth (also based on National Accounts) and the number 
of firms (ABR). 
 
 
28 I.e. the number of firms that entered and/or exited during some year as a percentage of the total number of firms at the 
beginning of that year.  
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Appendix B  Competition by industry 
The tables below present the main results for the 119 industries in the firm-level database. For 
each industry, they give a quick glance at the intensity of competition by presenting the levels 
of the RPM and the PCM, and at the changes in competition by the annual trend-growth of both 
indicators over the period 1994-2001. 
The analysis of chapter 2 and 3 are based on a part of the 119 industries. Tables B.1 and B.2 
present the competition indicators for 100 industries discussed in chapter 2. Here, 19 industries 
have been deleted due to one of the following reasons: 1) industries for which the RPM is 
negative in at least one year, as a RPM is not defined in theory; 2) post, telecommunication and 
‘other services’ ( respectively SIC codes 641, 642 and 930), as these industries experience 
implausible large shocks in the dataset; 3) garages and car dealers (SBI code 501), as we 
encountered probably a statistical error in combination with large weight of the PCM. 
Tables B.1 and B.3 present the 92 industries that are used for estimating the model in 
chapter 3. For the 27 industries that have been left out, data on the explanatory variables is 
missing for several years. It concerns particularly data on the number of firms and the entry and 
exit rate. Finally, 17 of the 119 industries are not used in either analysis of chapter 2 or 3. The 
latter industries are mentioned in table B.4. 
Table B.1  Changes in competition by industry (used in chapters 2 and 3) 
SIC-
code 
Name           Level 2001
      Annual  % trend-    
growth 1994-2001 
    RPM  PCM  RPM  PCM 
           
151  Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products  5.52  3.90  3.3  1.1 
152  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products  5.57  7.19  – 2.0  0.5 
153  Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  0.32  9.60  10.6  0.0 
154  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  18.72  4.50  – 16.2  3.1 
157  Manufacture of prepared animal feeds  7.99  3.76  – 0.9  – 5.1 
158  Manufacture of other food products  8.53  12.75  – 0.8  – 0.9 
159  Manufacture of beverages  2.48  33.41  8.1  – 0.2 
160  Manufacture of tobacco products  1.79  59.73  – 2.6  3.3 
172  Textile weaving  6.21  6.78  – 8.6  – 0.1 
173  Finishing of textiles  8.98  16.27  – 2.3  – 1.4 
174  Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel  5.14  8.64  – 8.8  – 1.5 
175  Manufacture of other textiles  10.65  7.51  – 2.2  – 0.8 
182  Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories  7.16  6.46  – 7.1  – 2.7 
192  Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness  11.37  10.49  – 3.0  5.1 
193  Manufacture of footwear  21.12  6.01  – 6.5  – 4.7 
203  Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery  5.85  9.36  – 4.7  2.3 
204  Manufacture of wooden containers  5.04  10.88  – 9.1  10.0 
205  Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, 









211  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  12.38  16.31  – 0.3  – 0.1  
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Table B1      Continued         
           
212  Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard  5.55  9.70  2.8  – 2.8 
221  Publishing  4.46  16.66  – 1.2  – 0.4 
222  Printing and service activities related to printing  4.56  11.72  – 1.0  – 0.5 
232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products  4.16  12.72  15.5  9.1 
241  Manufacture of basic chemicals  6.42  10.02  0.5  – 2.2 




















245  Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 









246  Manufacture of other chemical products  5.68  9.15  2.1  – 7.3 
251  Manufacture of rubber products  7.40  7.45  – 15.2  – 0.7 
252  Manufacture of plastic products  3.50  11.39  0.4  1.3 
261  Manufacture of glass and glass products  6.91  15.33  – 3.3  – 2.4 
264  Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay  2.79  22.98  – 4.9  – 3.5 
266  Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster or cement  4.68  15.46  – 2.9  – 0.2 
267  Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  1.22  5.90  – 2.2  – 1.6 
268  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  4.69  13.76  – 10.3  – 0.3 
274  Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals  7.75  8.21  0.5  – 0.6 
275  Casting of metals  10.28  4.41  1.9  – 5.8 
281  Manufacture of structural metal products  4.03  7.49  – 6.7  1.1 
282  Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufacture 



















285  Treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering  5.94  13.49  0.5  – 0.6 
286  Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware  5.66  8.95  1.3  – 2.8 
287  Manufacture of other fabricated metal products  6.83  8.55  – 8.8  – 0.9 
291  Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical 









292  Manufacture of other general purpose machinery  8.65  5.08  – 1.1  – 4.2 
293  Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery  8.32  7.16  1.9  – 2.6 
295  Manufacture of other special purpose machinery  4.46  9.58  – 4.9  – 1.6 
297  Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c.  9.38  7.53  – 8.0  0.4 
311  Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers  7.74  54.79  0.0  30.9 
312  Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus  3.75  4.12  – 3.9  – 5.0 
313  Manufacture of insulated wire and cable  10.30  3.38  0.6  – 8.7 
316  Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.  2.98  11.37  – 3.5  2.6 










332  Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, 














334  Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment  2.73  27.99  4.6  6.5 
341  Manufacture of motor vehicles  17.36  9.68  3.3  3.5 
342  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of 
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Table B1        Continued 
           










354  Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles  3.86  11.19  – 10.1  1.0 
361  Manufacture of furniture  4.96  10.01  – 4.5  – 0.5 
366  Other manufacturing n.e.c.  6.31  18.45  1.5  – 0.3 
451  Site preparation  0.81  14.99  – 10.5  2.5 
452  Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering  1.58  6.89  1.7  8.5 
454  Building completion  1.12  13.88  – 7.2  7.6 
455  Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator  0.90  20.37  2.4  – 0.3 
512  Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals  3.00  17.36  2.0  0.4 
513  Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco  3.91  22.80  1.6  – 0.9 
514  Wholesale of household goods  3.35  22.23  – 0.9  – 1.2 
515  Wholesale of non-agricultural intermediate products, waste and scrap  2.76  23.37  0.5  – 0.5 
516  Wholesale of machinery, equipment and supplies  3.48  24.06  1.6  0.9 
517  Other wholesale  3.78  26.46  0.1  – 0.8 
521  Retail sale in non-specialized stores  3.19  21.41  – 0.3  0.1 
522  Retail sale of food, beverage and tobacco in specialized stores  1.35  34.67  0.1  0.5 










524  Other retail sale of new goods in specialised stores  1.68  27.09  0.0  1.3 
525  Retail sale of second-hand goods in stores  1.24  32.64  – 5.0  – 4.2 
526  Retail sale not in stores  1.16  39.25  0.3  – 3.0 
527  Repair of personal and household goods  1.09  45.25  0.3  5.4 
721  Hardware consultancy  1.49  17.26  16.3  3.7 
722  Software consultancy and supply  1.45  15.63  11.1  3.7 
723  Data processing  0.98  21.09  – 21.4  1.7 
725  Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery  6.74  10.17  – 23.5  – 6.9 
741  Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax 
consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and 
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Table B.2  Changes in competition by industry (used in chapter 2 on top of table B.1 ) 
SIC-
code 
Name           Level 2001
  Annual % trend-
growth 1994-2001 
    RPM  PCM  RPM  PCM 
 
502  Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  1.94  18.51  – 4.2  3.0 
503  Sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories  1.72  24.60  1.4  7.3 
504  Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related parts and 
accessories 
1.47  34.09  – 8.9  12.1 
552  Camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation  1.84  29.81  3.1  – 1.8 
612  Inland water transport  1.00  39.29  8.3  0.2 
620  Air transport  4.65  5.56  15.8  – 16.2 
631  Cargo handling and storage  0.86  18.38  5.5  – 5.2 
632  Other supporting transport activities  1.28  42.77  – 1.2  – 5.3 
633  Travel agencies and tour operators; tourist assistance activities n.e.c.  4.42  4.65  – 2.2  – 3.2 
634  Activities of other transport agencies  2.68  7.84  – 3.1  – 9.4 
711  Renting of automobiles  1.98  50.59  – 15.1  7.2 
712  Renting of other transport equipment  1.44  41.74  – 0.1  5.6 
713  Renting of other machinery and equipment  0.95  30.08  n.a.  5.8 
714  Renting of personal and household goods n.e.c.  0.82  43.08  n.a.  7.7 
 
Table B.3  Changes in competition by industry (used in chapter 3 on top of table B.1 ) 
SIC-
code 
Name  Level 2001  Annual % trend-
growth 1994-2001  
           
    RPM  PCM  RPM  PCM 
           
155  Manufacture of dairy products  2.71  3.65  5.8  – 7.9 
294  Manufacture of machine-tools  14.32  – 2.98  – 1.7  3.1 
351  Building and repairing of ships and boats  2.12  7.68  – 14.2  8.4 
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Table B.4  Changes in competition by industry (not used) 
SIC-
code 
Name           Level 2001
a  Annual % trend-
growth 1994-2001 
    RPM  PCM  RPM  PCM 
           
315  Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps  8.53  – 1.35  35.2  – 23.1 
453  Building installation  1.51  9.12  13.3  – 8.5 
501  Sale of motor vehicles  1.79  15.78  5.1  – 0.2 
505  Retail sale of automotive fuel  1.23  22.48  – 3.0  5.8 
511  Wholesale on a fee or contract basis  2.71  25.72  – 7.6  n.a. 
551  Hotels  4.33  22.29  – 3.2  2.7 
553  Restaurants  2.68  20.87  – 0.8  1.0 
554  Bars  1.55  24.20  – 3.2  0.2 
555  Canteens and catering  0.43  9.08  – 8.2  3.2 
602  Other land transport  3.04  13.16  9.1  – 7.4 
611  Sea and coastal water transport  5.13
a  14.47
a  16.0  – 1.6 
641  Post and courier activities  0.27  18.31  2.9  11.7 
642  Telecommunications  1.52  32.83  n.a.  – 11.3 
745  Labour recruitment and provision of personnel  4.60  9.00  – 3.9  2.7 
747  Building-cleaning activities  1.58  14.72  0.6  0.9 
748  Other business activities n.e.c.  1.04  17.18  – 2.7  – 7.8 
930  Other service activities  0.98  31.53  – 0.8  1.3 
 
a Level of 2000.  
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Appendix C  Additional results on regulatory reforms 
The indicator on regulatory reforms provides an overall view on the impact of regulation in 
general, and it implicitly assumes complementarity between regulatory reforms.
29 However, the 
weighing of the separate regulatory reforms is debatable. Therefore, we also estimated the 
model by using two separate dummies. One dummy is related to the MDW-operation in specific 
industries
30, the other one refers to the enactment of the new Competition Act in 1998 (relevant 
for all industries). This alternative model provides more information on the impact of each 
regulatory reform, but it removes at the same time the overall view of the impact of regulation 
in general.  
Table C.1          Explanation of competition by regressing the RPM, 1994-2001, separate regulatory reforms  
Determinant
            Expected sign
 a  Estimated coefficient  t-value 
       
(Fitted) entry  +   0.09  0.52 
(Fitted) exit  -   0.39  1.40 
Market demand  -  – 0.31  – 2.36 
Import penetration  +  0.06  2.66 
Strategic interaction  +  0.08  5.45 
Advertising rate  ?  0.01  0.39 
       
Regulatory reforms  +     
   Dummy on MDW-operation  +  0.22  1.83 
   Dummy on Competition Act  +  0.07  1.66 
       
Lagged RPM  +  – 0.29  – 0.53 
       
Dummy construction sector    – 0.85  – 4.01 
Dummy services sector    – 0.68  – 5.13 
       
Intercept    – 0.58   – 0.91 
       
R- squared    0.63   
Degrees of freedom    692   
 
a
 Positive coefficient indicates positive effect on competition. 
 
 
29 In a similar way, for each OECD-country the OECD has constructed an overall indicator on regulation by weighing and 
adding up the impact of specific regulatory reforms (see OECD, 2000). However, these indicators are based on a single 
survey across the OECD-countries (i.e. in 1996), and thus only take a snapshot of the intensity of regulation. 
30 Note that the MDW-operation contains regulatory reforms in specific industries which are enacted in different years. So 
the MDW-dummy is industry-specific, and signals the years after the respective MDW-operation.  
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Table C.2          Explanation of competition by regressing the PCM, 1994-2001, separate regulatory reforms 
Determinant
            Expected sign
 a  Estimated coefficient  t– value 
       
(Fitted) entry rate  -   – 0.14  – 1.41 
(Fitted) exit rate  +   – 0.21  – 1.30 
Market demand  +  0.15  1.88 
Import penetration  -   – 0.01  – 0.82 
Strategic interaction  +  0.03  3.63 
Advertising rate  ?   0.02  0.97 
       
Regulatory reforms  -      
   Dummy on MDW-operation  –  – 0.06  – 0.74 
   Dummy on Competition Act  –  – 0.06  – 2.49 
       
Lagged PCM  +  0.84  36.93 
       
Dummy construction sector    0.08  0.65 
Dummy services sector    0.20  2.65 
       
Intercept    0.50  1.29 
       
R-squared    0.79   
Degrees of freedom    686   
 
a
 Negative coefficient indicates positive effect on competition, and visa versa. 
 
Table C.3  Estimation results of entry rate, 1994-2001, separate regulatory reforms 
Estimated with           RPM         PCM  
           
Determinants  Expected sign  Parameter  t-value  Parameter  t-value 
           
Lagged total sales (deflated)  +  0.54  5.53  0.54  5.53 
Lagged capital intensity/depreciation  -  – 0.03  – 1.54  – 0.03  – 1.41 
Lagged advertising rate  -  – 0.11  – 4.70  – 0.10  – 3.93 
           
Regulatory reforms           
    Lagged dummy on MDW-operation  +  – 0.50  – 5.80  – 0.50  – 5.78 
    Lagged dummy on Competition Act  +  – 0.15  – 4.26  – 0.15  – 4.18 
           
Lagged RPM   -  0.03  0.90     
Lagged PCM   +      – 0.02  – 0.72 
           
Lagged entry  +  0.05  4.50  0.04  4.45 
           
Dummy construction sector    0.36  2.82  0.31  2.68 
Dummy services sector    0.50  9.19  0.48  10.43 
           
Intercept    0.28  0.61  0.27  0.56 
           
R-squared    0.32    0.32   
Degrees of freedom    704    702   
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Table C.4  Estimation results of exit rate, 1994-2001, separate regulatory reforms  
Estimated with          RPM        PCM 
           
Determinants  Expected sign  Parameter  t-value  Parameter  t-value 
           
Lagged total sales (deflated)  -  0.07  0.78  0.06  0.68 
Lagged capital intensity/depreciation  -  – 0.03  – 1.94  – 0.04  – 2.33 
Lagged advertising rate  -  0.00  0.01  – 0.01  – 0.56 
           
Regulatory reforms  +         
    Lagged dummy on MDW-operation  +  – 0.15  – 1.91  – 0.15  – 1.93 
    Lagged dummy on Competition Act  +  – 0.12  – 3.70  – 0.12  – 3.63 
           
Lagged RPM   +  0.00  0.15     
Lagged PCM   -      0.04  1.39 
           
Lagged exit  +  0.02  3.40  0.02  3.45 
           
Dummy construction sector    – 0.17  – 1.49  – 0.18  – 1.71 
Dummy services sector    0.31  6.21  0.29  7.07 
           
Intercept    2.01  4.72  2.16  5.02 
           
R-squared    0.17    0.17   
Degrees of freedom    700    698   
 
The tables below present the results of this alternative model. Table C.1 shows that according to 
the regression of the RPM, both regulatory reforms have positively affected competition. Table 
C.2, representing the regression results of the PCM, confirms the positive impact of the new 
Competition Act on competition, but points to a non-significant impact of the MDW-operation. 
Tables C.3 and C.4 confirm the remarkable negative and significant effect of both regulatory 
reforms on the entry and exit rate (see section 3.3). 
 